Posted by: Adam Gibson | in Bitcoin | 1 month ago | 0 comments


You haven't read any other blog posts here? No worries, here's what you need to know (unless you're an expert, read them anyway...):

  • A utxo is an "unspent transaction output" - a Bitcoin transaction creates one or more of these, and each contains a specific amount of Bitcoin. Those outputs get "used up" in the transaction that spends them (somewhat like physical coins, someone gives you them in a payment to you, then you give them to someone else when you spend them; bitcoins aren't coins, utxos are coins; only difference is physical coins don't get destroyed in transactions).
  • The fees you have to pay for a Bitcoin transaction depend on how many bytes it takes up; this is *somewhat* dominated by how many inputs you provide, although there are other factors.
  • CoinJoin basically means - two or more people provide inputs (utxos) to a transaction and co-sign without needing trust, because when they sign that the output amounts and addresses are what they expect. Note that CoinJoin requires interaction, almost always.
  • Traditional "equal-sized" CoinJoin means a bunch of people paying themselves the same fixed amount in a single transaction (according to the process just mentioned), with the intention that nobody can tell which of the equal sized outputs belong to who (basically!).

The drawbacks of CoinJoin as implemented

Current implementations of CoinJoin are of the "equal-sized" variety (see above). This requires coordination, but it's possible to get a decent number of people to come together and agree to do a CoinJoin of a certain fixed amount. The negative is that this kind of transaction is trivially distinguishable from an "ordinary" transaction, in particular a payment from one counterparty to another. Here's a typical Joinmarket CoinJoin (and other implementations are just as, or more, distinguishable):


The biggest flag of "this is CoinJoin" is exactly the multiple equal-value (0.18875417 here) outputs that are the core premise of the idea, that give the anonymity. Here, you get anonymity in an "anonymity set" of all participants of this transaction, first, but through repeated rounds, you kind of get a much bigger anonymity set, ultimately of all participants of that CoinJoin implementation in the absolute best scenario. But it's still only a small chunk of Bitcoin usage generally.

And while this obviously gets better if more people use it, there is a limit to that thinking: because all participants are forced to use the same denomination for any single round, it isn't possible to fold in the payments you're doing using Bitcoin as a currency (don't laugh!) into these CoinJoin rounds (notice: this problem mostly disappears with blinded amounts).

So a world where "basically everyone uses CoinJoin" is cool for privacy, but could end up pretty bad for scalability, because these transactions are in addition to the normal payments.

Also, the fact that these transactions are trivially watermarked means that, if the blockchain analyst is not able to "crack" and unmix such transactions, he can at least isolate them in analysis. That's something; "these coins went from Exchange A to wallet B and then into this mixset" may be a somewhat negative result, but it's still a result. There are even noises made occasionally that coins might be blocked from being sent to certain exchange-type entities if they're seen to have come from a "mixer" (doesn't matter that CoinJoin is trustless mixing here; just that it's an activity specific for obfuscation).

I don't mean to scaremonger - I have used such CoinJoin for years (measured in the thousands) and will continue to do so, and never had payments blocked because of it. But this is another angle that must be borne in mind.

So let's say our primary goal is to minimize the negative privacy effects of blockchain analysis; can we do better? It's debatable, but we do have another angle of attack.

Hiding in a much bigger crowd ... ?

One angle is to make your behaviour look more like other, non-coinjoin transactions. (For the philosophically/abstract inclined people, this post might be of interest, but it sidetracks us here, so - later!). Let's think of the naive way to do that. Suppose just Alice and Bob make a 2 party CoinJoin:

0.05 BTC --->|   0.05 BTC  3AliceSAddReSs

0.05 BTC --->|   0.05 BTC  3BobSAddReSs

This first attempt is a clear failure - it "looks like an ordinary payment" only in the sense that it has two outputs (one change, one payment). But the failure is not just the obvious, that the output amounts are equal and so "obviously CoinJoin". There's another aspect of that failure, illustrated here:

0.01 BTC --->|   0.05 BTC  3AliceSAddReSs

0.04 BTC --->|   0.06 BTC  3BobSAddReSs

0.03 BTC --->|  

0.03 BTC --->|

This at least is more plausible as a payment, but it shows the subset sum problem that I was describing in my CoinJoinXT post - and trying to solve with CoinJoinUnlimited (i.e. using a Lightning channel to break the subset sum problem and feed-back the LN privacy onto the main chain). While the blockchain analyst could interpret this as a payment, semi-reasonably, of 0.05 btc by one participant, he could also notice that there are two subsets of the inputs that add up to 0.05, 0.06. And also splitting the outputs doesn't fundamentally solve that problem, notice (they'd also have to split into subsets), and it would anyway break the idea of "looking like a normal payment" (one payment, one change):

0.01 BTC --->|   0.011 BTC  3AliceSAddReSs

0.04 BTC --->|   0.022 BTC  3BobSAddReSs

0.03 BTC --->|   0.039 BTC  3Alice2

0.03 BTC --->|   0.038 BTC  3Bob2

After you think about this problem for a while you come to the conclusion - only if there's actually a transfer of coins from one party to the other is it solved. Hence CoinJoinXT.

But also, hence PayJoin - why not actually do a CoinJoin while you are making a payment?

PayJoin advantages

I'm not sure who first thought of doing CoinJoins (see bullet point at start) of this particular flavour, but a blogpost from Matthew Haywood last summer detailed an implementation approach which came out of a technical workshop in London shortly before, and a little later a BIP was put out by Ryan Havar.

The central idea is:

  • Let Bob do a CoinJoin with his customer Alice - he'll provide at least one utxo as input, and that/those utxos will be consumed, meaning that in net, he will have no more utxos after the transaction than before, and an obfuscation of ownership of the inputs will have happened without it looking different from an ordinary payment.

Before we look in detail at the advantages, it's worth answering my earlier question ("Why not actually do a CoinJoin while you are making a payment?") in the negative: it's not easy to coordinate that. It means that either (a) all wallets support it and have a way for *anyone* to connect to *anyone* to negotiate this (2-party) CoinJoin or (b) it's only limited to peer to peer payments between owners of a specific wallet that has a method for them to communicate. So let's be clear: this is not going to suddently take over the world, but incremental increases in usage could be tremendously valuable (I'll explain that statement shortly; but you probably already get it).

  • Advantage 1: Hiding the payment amount

This is what will immediately stand out from looking at the idea. Bob "chips in" a utxo (or sometimes more than one). So the payment output will be more than the actual payment, and it will be profoundly unobvious what the true payment amount was. Here's an example:

0.05 BTC --->|   0.04 BTC  3AliceSAddReSs

0.09 BTC --->|   0.18 BTC  3BobSAddReSs

0.08 BTC --->|

Now, actually, Alice paid Bob 0.1 BTC using 0.09 and 0.05, getting back 0.04 change. But what does a blockchain analyst think? His first interpretation will certainly be that there is a payment either of 0.04 BTC or 0.18 BTC, by the owner of the wallet containing all the inputs. Now, it probably seems very unlikely that the payment was 0.04 and the change 0.18. Why? Because, if the payment output were 0.04, why would you use all three of those utxos, and not just the first, say? (0.05). This line of reasoning we have called "UIH1" in the comments to this gist (h/t Chris Belcher for the nomenclature - "unnecessary input heuristic") for the details. To be fair, this kind of deduction by a blockchain analyst is unreliable, as it depends on wallet selection algorithms; many are not nearly so simplistic that this deduction would be correct. But possibly combined with wallet fingerprinting and detailed knowledge of wallet selection algorithms, it's one very reasonable line of attack to finding the change output and hence the payment output.

For those interested in the "weeds" I've reproduced the key points about this UIH1 and UIH2 (probably more important) including stats collected by LaurentMT of, in an "Appendix" section at the end of this post.

Anyway, what else could the payment amount be, in the transaction above? As well as 0.04 and 0.18, there is 0.09 and 0.01. Do you see the reasoning? If we assume that PayJoin is a possibility, then one party could be consuming 0.09 and 0.08 and getting back 0.01. And similarly for other contributions of inputs. In the simplest case, I would claim there are 4 potential payment amounts if there are only two inputs and we assume that one of the two is owned by the receiver. For the blockchain analyst, this is a huge mess.

  • Advantage 2 - breaking Heuristic 1

I discussed Heuristic 1 in the CoinJoinXT post. Simple description: people (analysts) assume that all the inputs to any particular transaction are owned by one wallet/owner; i.e. they assume coinjoin is not used, usually. Following the overall logic of our narrative here, it's obvious what the main point is with PayJoin - we break the heuristic without flagging to the external observer that the breakage has occurred. This is enormously important, even if the breakage of the assumption of common input ownership on its own seems rather trivial (especially if PayJoin is used by only few people), with only 2 counterparties in each transaction.

  • Advantage 3 - Utxo sanitization

This one might not occur to you immediately, at all, but is actually really nice. Consider the plight of the merchant who sells 1,000 widgest per day for Bitcoin. At the end of the day he has 1,000 utxos that he has to spend. Perhaps the next day he pays his supplier with 80% of the money; he'll have to construct a transaction (crudest scenario) with 800 inputs. It's not just that that costs a lot in fees (it does!); we can't really directly solve that problem (well - use layer 2! - but that's another blog post); but we can solve something else about it - the privacy. The merchant immediately links almost all of his payments in the 800-input payout transaction - horrible!

But PayJoin really helps this; each payment that comes in can consume the utxo of the last payment. Here are two fictitious widget payments in sequence to illustrate; Bob's utxos are bolded for clarity:

PayJoin 1 - Alice pays Bob 0.1 for a widget:

0.05 BTC --->|   0.04 BTC  3AliceSAddReSs

0.09 BTC --->|   0.18 BTC  3BobSAddReSs

0.08 BTC --->|

(notice: Bob used up one utxo and created one utxo - no net change)

PayJoin2 - Carol pays Bob 0.05 for a discount widget:

0.01 BTC --->|   0.02 BTC  3CarolSAddReSs

0.06 BTC --->|   0.23 BTC  3BobSAddReSs

0.18 BTC --->|

This would be a kind of snowball utxo in the naive interpretation, that gets bigger and bigger with each payment. In the fantasy case of every payment being PayJoin, the merchant has a particularly easy wallet to deal with - a wallet that only ever has 1 coin/utxo! (I know it's quite dubious to think that nobody could trace this sequence, there are other potential giveaways in this case than just Heuristic 1; but with Heuristic 1 gone, you have a lot more room to breathe, privacy-wise).

It's worth mentioning though that the full snowball effect can damage the anonymity set: after several such transactions, Bob's utxo is starting to get big, and may dwarf other utxos used in the transaction. In this case, the transaction will violate "UIH2" (you may remember UIH1 - again, see the Appendix for more details on this) because a wallet probably wouldn't choose other utxos if it can fulfil the payment with only one. So this may create a dynamic where it's better to mix PayJoin with non-PayJoin payments.

  • Advantage 4 - hiding in (and being helpful to) the large crowd

"...but incremental increases in usage could be tremendously valuable..." - let's be explicit about that now. If you're even reasonably careful, these PayJoin transactions will be basically indistinguishable from ordinary payments (see earlier comments about UIH1 and UIH2 here, which don't contradict this statement). It's a good idea to use decide on a specific locktime and sequence value that fits in with commonly used wallets (transaction version 2 makes the most sense). Now, here's the cool thing: suppose a small-ish uptake of this was publically observed. Let's say 5% of payments used this method. The point is that nobody will know which 5% of payments are PayJoin. That is a great achievement (one that we're not yet ready to achieve for some other privacy techniques which use custom scripts, for example; that may happen after Schnorr/taproot but not yet), because it means that all payments, including ones that don't use PayJoin, gain a privacy advantage!

Merchants? Automation?

The aforementioned BIP79 tries to address how this might work in a standardized protocol; there's probably still significant work to do before the becomes actualized. As it stands, it may be enough to have the following features:

  • Some kind of "endpoint" (hence "pay to endpoint"/p2ep) that a customer/payer can connect to encoded as some kind of URL. A Tor hidden service would be ideal, in some cases. It could be encoded in the payment request similar to BIP21 for example.
  • Some safety measures on the server side (the merchant/receiver) to make sure that an attacker doesn't use the service to connect, request, and block: thus enumerating the server's (merchant's) utxos. BIP79 has given one defensive measure against this that may be sufficient, Haywood's blog post discussed some more advanced ideas on that score.
  • To state the obvious friction point - wallets would have to implement such a thing, and it is not trivial compared to features like RBF which are pure Bitcoin.

Who pays the fees?

The "snowball effect" described above, where the merchant always has one utxo, may lead you to think that we are saving a lot of fees (no 800 input transactions). But not true except because of some second/third order effect: every payment to the merchant creates a utxo, and every one of those must be paid for in fees when consumed in some transaction. The effect here is to pay those fees slowly over time. And it's left open to the implementation how to distribute the bitcoin transaction fees of the CoinJoin. Most logically, each participant pays according to the amount of utxos they consume; I leave the question open here.

Implementation in practice

As far as I know as of this writing (mid-January 2019), there are two implementations of this idea in the wild. One is from Samourai Wallet, called Stowaway and the other is in Joinmarket as of version 0.5.2 (just released).

I gave a demo of the latter in my last post on this blog.

In both cases this is intended for peers to pay each other, i.e. it's not something for large scale merchant automation (as per discussion in previous section).

It requires communication between parties, as does any CoinJoin, except arguably SNICKER.

The sender of the payment always sends a non-CoinJoin payment transaction to start with; it's a convenient/sane thing to do, because if connection problems occur, or software problems, the receiver can simply broadcast this "fallback" payment instead.

In Joinmarket specifically, the implementation looks crudely like this:

Sender            Receiver

pubkey+versionrange -->

           <-- pubkey and version

(ECDH e2e encryption set up)

fallback tx --->

      <--- PayJoin tx partial-signed

co-signs and broadcasts

Before starting that interchange of course, the receiver must "send" (somehow) the sender the payment amount and destination address, as well as (in Joinmarket) an ephemeral "nick" to communicate over the message channel. Details here of course will vary, but bear in mind that as any normal payment, there must be some mechanism for receiver to communicate payment information to the sender.


This is another nail in the coffin of blockchain analysis. If 5% of us do this, it will not be safe to assume that a totally ordinary looking payment is not a CoinJoin. That's basically it.


Appendix: Unnecessary Input Heuristics

The health warning to this reasoning has already been given: wallets will definitely not always respect the logic given below - I know of at least one such case (h/t David Harding). However I think it's worth paying attention to (this is slightly edited from the comment section of the referenced gist):


"UIH1" : one output is smaller than any input. This heuristically implies that that output is not a payment, and must therefore be a change output.

"UIH2": one input is larger than any output. This heuristically implies that no output is a payment, or, to say it better, it implies that this is not a normal wallet-created payment, it's something strange/exotic.

Note: UIH2 does not necessarily imply UIH1.


So we just have to focus on UIH2. Avoiding UIH1 condition is nice, because it means that both outputs could be the payment; but in any case the normal blockchain analysis will be wrong about the payment amount. If we don't avoid the UIH2 condition, though, we lose the steganographic aspect which is at least 50% of the appeal of this technique.

Joinmarket's current implementation does its best to avoid UIH2, but proceeds with PayJoin anyway even if it can't. The reasoning is partially as already discussed: not all wallets follow this logic; the other part of the reasoning is the actual data, as we see next:

Data collection from LaurentMT:

From block 552084 to block 552207 (One day: 01/12/2018)

  • Txs with 2 outputs and more than 1 input = 35,349
    • UIH1 Txs (identifiable change output) = 19,020 (0.54)
    • !UIH1 Txs = 16,203 (0.46)
    • Ambiguous Txs = 126 (0.00)

From block 552322 to block 553207 (One week: 03/12/2018 - 09/12/2018)

  • Txs with 2 outputs and more than 1 input = 268,092
    • UIH1 Txs (identifiable change output) = 145,264 (0.54)
    • !UIH1 Txs = 121,820 (0.45)
    • Ambiguous Txs = 1,008 (0.00)

And here are a few stats for UIH2:

Stats from block 552084 to block 552207 (One day: 01/12/2018)

  • Txs with 2 outputs and more than 1 input = 35,349
    • UIH2 Txs = 10,986 (0.31)
    • !UIH2 Txs = 23,596 (0.67)
    • Ambiguous Txs = 767 (0.02)

From block 552322 to block 553207 (One week: 03/12/2018 - 09/12/2018)

  • Txs with 2 outputs and more than 1 input = 268,092
    • UIH2 Txs = 83,513 (0.31)
    • !UIH2 Txs = 178,638 (0.67)
    • Ambiguous Txs = 5,941 (0.02)

Current rating: 5


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