Some time ago I wrote this gist, which is an ill-formed technical concept about a way you could do steganography leveraging randomness in existing network protocols; but I also called it a "manifesto", jokingly, because I realised the thinking behind it is inherently political.
There are a few reasons why the phrase "If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear" is wrong and insidiously so. One of the main ones is simply this: my threat model is not only my government, even if my government is perfect and totally legitimate (to me). But no government is perfect, and some of them are literally monstrous.
So while it's true that there are uses of cryptography harmonious with a PG13 version of the world - simply protecting obviously sensitive data within the control of authorities - there are plenty where it is entirely ethically right and necessary to make that protection absolute.
The question then arises, as was raised in the above gist, what are the properties of algorithms that satisfy the requirement of defence even against hostile authorities?
The modern tradition of cryptography uses Kerckhoff's Law as one of its axioms, and steganography does not fit into this model. But that's because the tradition is built by people in industry who are fine with people knowing they are using cryptography. In an environment where that is not acceptable, steganography is not on a list of options - it's more like the sine qua non.
On a blockchain, we have already understood this "freedom fighter" model. It's an essential part of how the thing was even created, and why it exists. And there are essentially two principal complaints about Bitcoin and its blockchain, both of which are somewhat related to this:
The first is obvious - if we don't create "steganographic" transactions, then governments, and everyone else, may get to know at least something about our transactions. The second is less so - but in the absence of scale we have a small anonymity set. Smaller payment network effects and smaller anonymity sets obviously hamper use of these systems by a "freedom fighter". But remember the scale limitations come directly out of the design of the system with censorship resistance and independent verification in mind.
Attempts to improve the privacy by altering the way in which transactions are done have a tendency to make the scalability worse - the obvious example being CoinJoin, which with unblinded amounts inevitably involves larger numbers of outputs and larger numbers of transactions even.
A less obvious example is Confidential Transcations; when we blind outputs we need to use up more space to create the necessary guarantees about the properties of the amounts - see the range proof, which with Borromean ring signatures or bulletproofs need a lot of extra space. The same is true of ring signature approaches generally to confidentiality.
You can trade off space usage for computation though - e.g. zkSNARKs which are quite compact in space but take a lot of CPU time to create (and in a way they take a lot of space in a different sense - memory usage for proof creation).
You can improve this situation by localising trust in space or time. There are obvious models - the bank of the type set up by digicash. See the concept of Chaumian tokens generally. One project that looked into creating such things was OpenTransactions, another was Loom, also see Truledger.
Trust can be localised in time as well - and the aforementioned zkSnarks are an example; they use a trusted setup as a bootstrap. This trust can be ameliorated with a multiparty computation protocol such that trust is reduced by requiring all participants to be corrupt for the final result to be corrupt; but it is still trust.
For any attribute which is perfectly (or computationally) hidden, we have a corresponding security downgrade. If attribute A is required to satisfy condition C by the rules of protocol P, and attribute A is blinded to A* by a privacy mechanism M, in such a way that we use the fact that C* is guaranteed by A*, then we can say that P's security is "downgraded" by M in the specific sense that the C-guarantee has been changed to the C*-guarantee, where (inevitably) the C* guarantee is not as strong, since it requires the soundess of M as well as whatever assumptions already existed for the soundness of C.
However, the situation is worse - precisely because M is a privacy mechanism, it reduces public verifiability, and specifically verifiability of the condition C, meaning that if the C* guarantee (which we can publically verify) fails to provide C, there will be no public knowledge of that failure.
To give a concrete example of the above template, consider what happens to Bitcoin under Confidential Transactions with Pedersen commitments (set aside the range proof for a moment). Since Pedersen commitments are perfectly hiding but only computationally binding, we have:
P = Bitcoin
A = Bitcoin amounts of outputs
C = amount balance in transactions
M = CT with Pedersen commitments
A* = Pedersen commitments of outputs
C* = Pedersen commitment balance in transactions
Here the downgrade in security is specifically the computational binding of Pedersen commitments (note: that's assuming both ECDLP intractability *and* NUMS-ness of a curve point). Without Pedersen/CT, there are *no* assumptions about amount balance, since integers are "perfectly binding" :) With it, any failure of the computational binding is catastrophic, since we won't see it.
For any attribute A which is obfuscated by a privacy mechanism M in protocol P (note: I'm choosing the word "obfuscation" here to indicate that the hiding is not perfect - note the contrast with the previous section), we have a corresponding scalability failure. M may obfuscate an attribute A by expanding the set of possible values/states from A to A[N]. To commit to the obfuscation soundly it must publish data of order ~ N x size(A). Also note that it is possible for the obfuscation goal to be achieved without an increase in space usage, if multiple parties can coordinate their transactions, but here we ignore this possibility because it requires all parties to agree that all attributes except A to be identical (example: multiple participants must accept their newly created outputs are equal value). This is not really a "transaction" in the normal sense.
A concrete example: equal-sized Coinjoin in Bitcoin:
P = Bitcoin
A = receiver of funds in a transaction
A[N] = set of N outputs of equal size
M = Coinjoin
A less obvious example but fitting the same pattern; ElGamal commitment based Confidential Transactions (as opposed to Pedersen commitments based)
P = Bitcoin
A = output amount in a transaction
A[N] = ElGamal commitment to amount, here 2 curve points, N=2
M = ElGamal commitments
Here N=2 requires some explaining. An ElGamal commitment is perfectly binding, and to achieve that goal the commitment must have 2 points, as the input has two values (scalars), one for blinding and the other for binding the amount. So we see in this case the expansion in practice is more than just a single integer, it's from a single bitcoin-encoded integer to two curve points. But the details obviously vary; the general concept is to whatever extent we obfuscate, without throwing in extra security assumptions, we require more data.
The structure above is trying to make an argument, which I believe is pretty strong - that this represents searching for privacy, in a blockchain context, in slightly the wrong way.
If we try to make the blockchain itself private, we are slightly pushing against its inherent nature. Its crucial feature is public verifiability, and while it's true that this does not require all attributes properties to be "unblinded" nor "unobfuscated", we see above that introducing blinding or obfuscation is problematic; you either degrade security in a way that's not acceptable because it introduces invisible breaks, or you degrade scalability (such as using a perfectly binding commitment requiring no compression, or a zero knowledge proof taking up a lot of space or computation time), or you degrade trustlessness (see: trusted setup zkps). I have no absolute theorem that says that you cannot get rid of all of these problems simultaneously; but it certainly seems hard!
This is where the idea of a "steganographic blockchain" comes in; if instead of trying to hide attributes of transactions, we try to make the meaning of transactions be something not explicit to the chain, but agreed upon by arbitrary participants using mechanisms outside it. This allows one to leverage the blockchain's principal feature - censorship resistant proof of state changes, in public, without inheriting its main bugs - lack of privacy and scalability, and without degrading its own security.
The biggest practical problem with steganography has always been bandwidth; if you use non-random data such as images or videos, which are often using compression algorithms to maximise their signal to noise ratio, you have the problem of getting sufficient "cover traffic" over your hidden message.
Note that this problem does not occur at all in cases where your hidden message is embedded into another message which is random. This is the case with digital signatures; ECDSA and Schnorr for example are both publish as two random values each of which is about 32 bytes.
To go back to the previously mentioned example of scriptless scripts, we can see that the atomic swap protocol based on it as described in my blog post, exploits this directly. On chain we see two (not obviously related) transactions with Schnorr signatures that are, to the outside observer, in no way related; the hiding of the connection is perfect, but the binding/atomicity of the two payments is still secure, just not perfectly so (it's based on the ECDLP hardness assumption, but then so are ordinary payments).
Note how this is a different philosophy/approach to hiding/privacy: since such a swap leaves no fingerprint on-chain, the concept of anonymity set blurs; it's strictly all transactions (assuming Schnorr in future, or ECDSA-2PC now), even if most people do not use the technique. To get that same effect with an enforced privacy overlay mechanism M for all participants, we tradeoff the security or scalability issues mentioned above.
This is the reason for my slightly click-baity-y subtitle "High Bandwidth Steganography". A big chunk of the Bitcoin blockchain is random (as those who've tried to compress it have learned to their chagrin), and so it's not quite as hard to usual to hide transaction semantics (the ideal case will be inside signatures using scriptless script type constructs), so in a sense we can get a very high bandwidth of data communicated client to client without using any extra space on chain, and without "polluting" the chain with extra security assumptions.Share on Twitter Share on Facebook
Adam Gibson (19)